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This paper examines 680 initial U.S. takeover rumours which name both bidder and target firms 
from 2002 to 2011. We find that rumours attributed to an insider and those indicating a positive 
synergy would result from a takeover are significant predictors of future takeover announcements 
between these rumoured firms. Interestingly, these same rumour types are also significantly 
related to pre-rumour bidder firm returns. In addition, bidding firm rumour date returns are 
significantly higher for smaller firms, in line with the literature for bidding firm announcement 
date effects. Finally, for the subsample of rumoured firms which do engage in the rumored 
takeover, we find that the longer the interval between the rumour date and announcement date, the 
more positive the announcement date return. In sum, we interpret results as evidence confirming 
hypotheses that the anticipation of takeovers should be accounted for in the analysis of 
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According to Clarkson et al. (2006), any objectively unverified information can be 
classified as rumour in the merger and acquisition (M&A) market. Despite the fact 
that some rumours are spread by “word of mouth,” there also exist newspapers, 
newswires, and journals for rumour dissemination. Considering the incapacity to 
catch all the rumours in the market and the necessity to weed out those completely 
unsubstantiated, we select the published rumours though they might be not able to 
represent all the rumours in the market. During the process of rumour dissemination, 
some rumours can appear more than once in different media. To capture the initial 
market reaction without fear of the market already impounding this information into 
its price, we focus on those initial rumours that have not been mentioned within 90 
days prior and examine the impact of initial rumours on potential bidding firms. 
The efficient market hypothesis suggests that markets could process information 
rapidly. However, the commonly measured returns (Jensen and Rubach, 1983; Jarrell, 
Brickley and Netter, 1988; Jarrell and Poulsen, 1989; Andrade and Mitchell and 
Stafford, 2001) to the bidders is close to zero, while the target shareholders seem to 
capture the majority of the value gains generated by a merger. Considering continuous 
bidding activities, it is hard not to wonder the motives for bidders and why they end 
up with a nearly neutral reaction to announcements. One fair explanation is that the 
announcement information could have already been released or anticipated before the 
announcement (Jensen and Ruback, 1983). Rumour is such an important method of 
information transfer that very few takeover bids for publicly held corporations are true 
surprises, according to Pound and Zeckhauser (1990). 
In this paper, we hand collect 2,074 initial rumours, of which 680 mention the 
possible bidder and thus are used herein. Compared with former rumour research 
studies, the sample size is relatively larger (42 observations in Pound and Zechhauser 
[1990], 60 in Murray [1994], and 476 in Clarkson et al. [2006]), and unlike these 




We find that the size effect for initial rumoured bidder returns is similar to that for 
announcement bidder returns in Moeller et al. (2004). In addition, we show that 
merger anticipation lessens the announcement cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), 
as stated by Cornett et al. (2011), based on our hand-collected sample. The source of 
the rumours’ abnormal returns suggests market participants can use public 
information to anticipate rumours (i.e., cash ratio and synergies) and have access to 
information leaks, which means they know about information later revealed by 
insiders. They use this information to anticipate future announcements and create 
abnormal trading volumes based on initial rumour information surrounding initial 
rumour dates. If an initial rumour actually turns into an announcement, the closer it 
appears to the announcement, the more negative the impact it would have on the 
announcement. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the 
background and literature review. The data and methodology are described in Section 
3. Following the data explanation, Section 4 presents the empirical results of the 
regressions. Finally, Section 5 provides the conclusion. 
 
2. Background and literature review 
The financial literature has been long interested in explaining the magnitude and 
source of abnormal returns to bidding firms. As former literature studies report that 
the unconditional abnormal announcement return to bidders is close to zero or slightly 
negative, it is easily concluded that the majority of wealth gained by mergers and 
acquisitions is captured by the target firms. According to Moeller, Schlingemann, and 
Stulz (2004), the stock returns of firms announcing a bid yield a sizable effect, which 
suggests smaller acquirers gain higher announcement returns. 
Keown and Pinkerton (1981) indicate that announcement CARs are influenced by 
information leaks from intermediaries involved in the acquisition negotiation process. 
Rumours originating in this way have a more negative impact on bidder’s returns, as 
they often represent a fiduciary breach of a confidentiality agreement. Once the 
 3 
 
information leaks or is captured by the marketplace, other investors would follow and 
mimic the trading activity, ruining the announcement surprise. 
The market anticipation hypothesis (Jensen and Ruback, 1983) suggests that 
investors could anticipate a takeover transaction based on rumours in the press, 
industry trends, or specific public information. The research by Cornett et al. (2011) 
shows that investors can anticipate the bidder or target’s merger candidacy, and further, 
bidders are more easily anticipated. Song and Walkling (2008) provide strong 
evidence that initial bidding activity in an industry also has a great ability to predict 
an acquisition, making bidding a wealth-creating activity. 
In the real financial world, it is not easy to distinguish whether a rumour comes 
from anticipation or an insider leak. However, the information involved in a rumour or, 
simply, the appearance of a rumour could draw the market’s attention or some 
“reasonable doubts” about the potential takeover. Therefore, what we are trying to ask 
here is how the rumours would affect bidding firms. 
 
3. Sample data and methodology 
In this paper, we define rumours as any public conjecture published in newspapers, 
newswires, business journals, and/or trade journals that expressly indicate a public 
U.S. firm (contained within the Center for Research in Security Prices, or CRSP, 
database) is a likely target of an impending merger or acquisition. Specific sources 
thoroughly investigated include the databases of the S&P Capital IQ, S&P Takeover 
Talk, and Zephyr, as well as the online services of Factiva and Pro-Quest (which 
themselves include thousands of newswires and printed communications, including 
the Wall Street Journal, the Economist, Bloomberg BusinessWeek, and Dow Jones 
Newswires, among many others). 
To uncover such rumours, a proprietary algorithm was developed by first 
investigating actual takeover rumours we could easily identify—those available in 
S&P Takeover Talk, S&P Capital IQ, and Zephyr. We then supplemented this via a 
Google search of articles containing similar terms. An initial sample of over 100 
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different takeover rumours thus provided our basis in developing an algorithm to 
search for additional takeover rumours contained within Factiva and Pro-Quest. This 
algorithm contained terms such as “strategic alternative,” “buyout,” “sale of the firm,” 
“looking to be acquired,” “takeover candidate,” and “takeover chatter,” among others, 
in combination with Boolean logic and another set of terms, such as merger, takeover, 
rumour, chatter, acquis*, and so on. 
We then sifted through these articles uncovered in Factiva (and later Pro-Quest 
news sources not overlapping with Factiva, such as the Financial Times, Barron’s, 
Mergers & Acquisitions Report, and many others) using this proprietary algorithm. As 
this algorithm resulted in many false positives, the researchers manually distinguished 
articles containing takeover rumours from those that did not. This resulted in a 
process whereby some rumours may have been missed (either not captured by the 
algorithm or not properly identified as such by the researcher), but rumours that were 
identified are likely to be accurate (as they are read rather than solely defined by an 
algorithm). 
Once a takeover rumour has thus been identified, the researchers use a new 
algorithm incorporating only the target firm’s name to more accurately uncover any 
additional preceding rumours. In this way, we ensure the initial takeover rumour 
within a period of 90 days has been found. Once this takeover rumour has been 
identified as the initial rumour, it is then assigned a “type,” one of nine categories, as 
detailed in the appendices: MultipleBidder, PEFundor, Analyst, Chatter, Insider, 
OptionChanges, Synergy, InitiatedByTarget, or TargetFinancialAdvisor. 
Then we verified the rumours by checking their announcement dates (if available). 
If both parties, the bidder and the target, indicate a bid has been made and declare the 
deal amount, this constitutes an announcement date. We exclude those rumours 
having an announcement on the same day or one day after for the reason it might be a 
normal publication time delay by different media. In addition, we also exclude foreign 
bidders and those no longer listed in the CRSP database. After all, we collected 2,074 
rumours, of which 680 indicate a bidder’s name, between January 1, 2002 and 
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December 31, 2011. The rumour description is separated by year in Table 1. As we 
show, the number of rumours grew from 2002 and peaked at 129 in 2009. A relatively 
small percentage (12%) finally turned into a takeover announcement. In addition, 
nearly half (45%) of rumoured bidders are not the only bidder mentioned in the 
rumour. In terms of the source of the rumour, only 8% involve the PE funder, 46% 
come from financial analysts, and 20% originate from chatters. Meanwhile, 22% of 
rumours are from anonymous sources or insiders. 
We used the CRSP-COMPUSTAT database to compile financial statement data for 
the 10-year period from 2002 to 2011. The sample of actual announcements is based 
on Security Data Company’s (SDC) US Mergers and Acquisitions database. We 
collect the first announcement, wherein the rumoured bidder makes a bid for the 
target, and we exclude announcements within one day after the rumours. 
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Rumour abnormal returns and size effect 
To determine whether the market reacts efficiently to takeover rumours, we employ 
the standard event study by estimating the abnormal percentage returns (following 
Brown and Warner, 1985). The estimation period covers the 240 days, from t-300 
through t-61, where day t represents the rumour date. A minimum of 100 daily returns 
is required; otherwise, the case is dropped. The estimation test yields the CRSP 
Equal-weighted Index returns using the market model. The abnormal return is the 
difference between the actual and estimated returns for these potential bidding firms. 
CARs include the price impact over the (-42,-2), (-1, 0), (-1, 1), (-2, 2), (-3, 3), and (-5, 
5) periods. Statistical significance is tested by a T test. 
The equally weighted abnormal returns for our sample is given in Column 1 of 
Table 2. The CARs for the pre-rumour period (-42,-2) are slightly negative (-0.24%), 
while those around the rumour date, (-1, 0), (-1, 1), (-2, 2), (-3, 3), and (-5, 5), are 
positive. The results are statistically insignificant, which is also observed by former 
research studies (i.e., Jensen and Ruback [1983]) when studying the performance of 
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bidders’ announcement CARs. However, the adverse implies that rumours might 
change the market’s reaction to the bidder because they would draw the market’s 
attention to the bidder and increase the probability of a potential acquisition. 
Former research (Siganos, 2013) shows the media’s attention would explain the 
price run-up before announcements. Due to the size effect, larger firms would attract 
relatively greater attention than smaller ones. In addition, Moeller et al. (2004) argue 
the managers of larger firms might be more prone to overconfidence, and the greater 
premium paid by large firms decreases the average abnormal returns of large firms. 
Accordingly, to examine whether the size effect is predicted by a rumour, we divide 
the sample into two subsamples by firm size. We define the big firms in a given year 
as those firms whose assets falls above the median of the whole sample, and the rest 
are labeled as big firms. 
Columns 2 and 3 in Table 2 show the CARs for two subsamples of small firms and 
big firms. The big firms gain insignificant positive pre-rumour returns; however, their 
rumour CARs are significantly negative. On the other hand, the results for the small 
firms are quite different from those of big firms. They are insignificantly negative in 
the pre-rumour period, but significantly positive surrounding the appearance of 
rumours. 
For a robustness test, we followed Moeller et al. (2004) using the percentile of New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) firms in the year in which the rumour is initially 
mentioned to distinguish different firm sizes. The results are shown in Columns 4 and 
5 in Table 2. Considering the bidders involved in rumours most likely have great 
assets and impact, we select those with total assets within the top 10% percentile of 
NYSE firms as big firms. The results, shown in Columns 4 and 5 in Table 1, are 
similar to what we found before. Besides the market model, we also test the 
Fama-French model, and the size effects are still consistent. 
This disparity suggests the existence of a size effect in bidder’s rumour returns. The 
small firms have a nearly 0.65% higher rumour return than the big firms in the 
two-day rumour period and an even higher return (0.72%) in the three-day rumour 
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period. Moeller et al. (2004) show a roughly two percentage higher announcement 
return for acquiring-firm shareholders. Rumour return may not be as high as 
announcement return, but the similarity of their size effects indicates uncertain 
information (rumours) could share the pattern of more certain information 
(announcements); furthermore, considering that firm size could be used as a proxy for 
the easiness of anticipation, bigger firms could be more likely to be predicted. This 
also proves evidence that information about an acquisition could have already been 
known by the market through rumours before the official announcement. As a result, 
when run-up is incorporated with the announcement returns, there might also suggest 
no significant results. This underscores the importance of not analyzing 
announcement dates without a lengthy run-up window as well. 
 
4.2 Regression of bidder rumour CAR 
After identifying the abnormal rumour returns, we then focus on pinpointing the 
source of the abnormal returns. Rumours affect the stock price by absorbing some of 
the announcement information into the price. Therefore, investors could value the 
impending merger transaction and prepare for it based on the motivations for the 
mergers and information carried by the rumours. 
The anticipation hypothesis suggests that mergers are driven under certain 
motivations (generate shareholder value and/or opportunistic benefits), and these 
motivations could be observed by professional analysts to predict mergers. Cornett et 
al. (2011) state that mergers, which generate shareholder value, are usually launched 
under four circumstances: 1) by reallocating resources to withstand economic 
disturbances; 2) by achieving economies of scale and scope; 3) by gaining access to 
additional sources of capital that allow the firm to grow; and 4) by exploiting 
discrepancies in valuation. 
Following Cornett et al. (2011), we use sales shock as our proxy for economic 
disturbance. Sales shock is defined as the absolute value of the difference between the 
two-year median industry sales growth and the two-year median sales growth for all 
 8 
 
firms in the sample. A greater economic disturbance indicates greater management’s 
desire to acquire another firm. 
Economies of scale and scope are measured as firm size and sales level. We define 
firm size as the natural logarithm of total asset, change in size as the percentage 
change in the book value of the assets of the firm in the previous two years, and sales 
growth as the percentage change in the firm’s net sales in the previous two years. A 
larger size, a greater change in size, and greater sales growth are associated with a 
higher possibility of acquisition.  
Besides, when facing economic disturbance and pursuing economies of scale and 
scope, big firms would attempt to reduce competition by intra-industry mergers, and 
small firms are likely to engage in cross-industry mergers to survive. Therefore, a 
high industrial concentration ratio is related to a high likelihood of acquisition. In 
addition, we define the concentration ratio as the ratio of the sales of the largest four 
firms (in terms of sales) to total industry sales. 
For a firm that is further along its lifecycle and exhausts its internal growth 
opportunities, it might be large and desire the acquisition of external sources to grow. 
We use resource-growth-mismatch, as with Palepu (1986) and Ambrose and 
Megginson (1992), to measure desire, which is defined as a dummy variable equal to 
one if i) sales growth for a firm in the last two years is less than the industry median 
and the long-term debt ratio is greater than the industry median or ii) if sales growth 
in the last two years is greater than the industry median and the long-term debt ratio is 
less than the industry median and zero otherwise. The cash ratio, return on assets 
(ROA), and price run-up are the proxies for a bidder’s capability of gaining such 
resources: the cash ratio is the ratio of cash to total assets, ROA is the ratio of net 
income before extraordinary (or non-recurring) items to total assets, and price run-up 
is the percentage change in a firm’s stock price in the prior two years. 
We use the share turnover to measure the discrepancies in valuation. Following 
Gort (1969), a higher share turnover suggests a higher bidder candidacy. The share 
turnover is measured as the ratio of the number of shares of stock traded for the firm 
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to the total shares outstanding. 
Regarding opportunistic benefits, managers are motivated to propose a series of 
mergers to build their empire, and firms with a history of mergers are more likely to 
propose additional bids. Accordingly, we use previous mergers, as with Cornett et al. 
(2011), to count the number of times a firm proposes a merger bid in the prior two 
years. 
Song and Walkling (2008) suggest that a bidder might be more motivated by 
merger wave than shareholder value. We define the dormant period, according to 
Cornett et al. (2011), as the number of months since the last merger in the industry, 
while industry is defined at the 3-digit SIC (Standard Industrial Classification) level. 
In addition to the variables used by Cornett et al. (2011), we use the rumour type 
dummy labeled in the data collection process to identify the characteristics of rumours. 
We categorize rumours into four aspects: competition, source of rumour, insider, and 
supporting evidence. 
Competition records whether another bidder is involved in the rumour. Once more 
than one acquiring firm is mentioned in the rumour, the rumour effect would be 
shared by multiple participants. We include three common sources of rumours (public 
equity funder, analyst, and chatter) and expect that different sources of information 
would bring different market reactions. Insider rumours come from anonymous 
sources indicating that a certain firm is looking forward to a takeover. These rumours 
could be information leaks from the negotiation between bidder and target, which 
represents the illegal information transfer in the pre-announcement period. In terms of 
the evidence supporting rumours, we collect those market activities and target 
reactions: option change and strong synergy are repeatedly used by media to support 
rumours. As well, if a target is initiated by a target or a target has an advisor, this may 
lend credibility to an impending deal. 
The first regression we run is to check whether there is any run-up effect before the 
rumours. Although we collect only initial rumours within 90 days, information could 
have leaked or have been anticipated in other untraceable ways. Therefore, we 
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examine whether the pre-rumour run-up could be explained by these variables. We 
show the results in Column 1 of Table 3, and it seems some factors dominate the 
run-up CARs during the (-42,-2) period. As we have expected, bidding firms with 
excess cash imply they have exhausted their internal growth opportunities and turn to 
acquire other firms instead of investing in their own. A higher cash ratio, as Harford et 
al. (2008) argue, indicates a greater desire for the managers to spend their cash on 
acquisitions. Supporting this theory, we find the cash ratio is positively related to the 
run-ups at the 1.4% significance level. Another positive factor is a target’s strong 
synergy at the 2% significance level. Insiders (2% significance level), along with 
abnormal option or volume changes (8% significance level), are the main sources of 
negative attitudes towards pre-rumour run-ups.  
In Column 2 of Table 3, we report the results of regressions on the two-day CARs 
surrounding the rumour period. The event period examined is the rumour day and one 
day prior. This regression would help us to understand the source of the abnormal 
rumour returns. A higher cash ratio is significantly related to higher abnormal returns, 
extending its pre-rumour pattern during the rumour period. 
In Table 4, we regress the rumour CAR on credible rumours (those leading to 
announcement, considering both rumour period and pre-rumour period. The variables 
used by Cornett et al. (2011) tend to have a better explanation power on the rumour 
CARs. Previous sales growth, ROA, cash ratio and price run-up are all significantly 
related with CAR during both periods and insider rumours are negative predictors of 
credibility. 
Our result shows that some patterns occur even before the rumours are in the press, 
indicating market participants can use both public information to anticipate rumours 
(synergies, cash ratio, and target option changes) and have access to information leaks 
(they seem to know about rumour information later revealed by insiders). 
 
4.3 Logistic regression 
We further launch a logistic regression to examine rumours’ predictive power, 
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assuming that the variables we used in Table 3 would help to anticipate future merger 
announcements. The dependent dummy variable equals 1 if the acquirer makes an 
SDC announcement for the target after the rumour and 0 otherwise. 
In Table 5, we find rumours’ predictive power comes mainly from four aspects. The 
first is the growth of sales, which would present the past growth and imply further 
expansion through bidding. We find it significant at the 10% level. Another predictive 
variable is the dormant period. Song and Walkling (2008) find evidence that the 
abnormal returns of bidding firms are significantly positively related to the length 
between bid announcements in an industry. Our result shows that after a long dormant 
period, a rumour is more likely to be true (at the 1% level). The third aspect is insider; 
as they might get their information directly from the negotiation, it is expected they 
would increase the possibility of an announcement (10% significance). The last is a 
strong synergy, which benefits both parties and which is also significantly positively 
(5%) related to the probability of bidding. 
 
4.4 Price-volume dynamics 
In this part, we study whether the abnormal returns appear with any abnormal 
trading activity, including how the types of rumours could influence trading. We have 
reported that certain rumour types (i.e., insider) have an impact on pre-rumour returns. 
It implies the rumour information seems to have already been known by market 
participants and that the informed trading has taken place before the rumour. 
To obverse the price-volume dynamics of the initial rumour, we use the abnormal 
turnover measure follows Bris (2005) and King (2009) as: 
ATit = {
Turnit − [Turni̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ + 2σTurn]      if Turnit > Turni̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ + 2σTurn
0                                              otherwise
, 
where  Turnit is the volume of shares traded in bidder firms i on day t divided by 
the number of shares outstanding. Turni̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ and σTurn  are the mean and standard 
deviation of daily turnover in bidder firm i over (-300, -60). Abnormal Turnover (AT) 
is always positive, because it implies the excess trading volume by insiders. A 
statistically significant abnormal turnover suggests the turnover that a bidder firm 
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experienced on a given day is at least two standard deviations greater than the average 
turnover over (-300, -60). 
The daily abnormal return (AR) is adjusted by the CRSP Equal-weighted Index 
using market model. Similar to our tests before, the estimation period is (-300, -60) 
and a minimum of 100 daily returns is required. Bid-ask spread is the natural 
logarithm of the proportional effective bid-ask spread on day t. The number of trades 
measured as the natural logarithm of the number of transactions on day t, and size is 
the natural logarithm of the total asset. Rumour type (i.e., multiple bidder, PE funder, 
analyst, etc.) is the same as before. Besides, we include the interaction terms between 
ATit and rumour type, examining which rumour types are more likely to trigger 
abnormal trading. 
The results in Columns 1 of Table 6 show that though some information has not 
been revealed yet in the press, it could be captured by some investors. A negative 
relation between AR and AT is found, suggesting that AR are lower on trading days 
with AT. Number of trades is positively related with AR while size is negatively 
related with AR. PE funders, analysts, chatter, and target’s advisor could be positively 
related with AR during the pre-rumour days with ATs. Multiple bidders are negatively 
related to AR on the AT days. Insider and option changes have a negative impact on 
AR, but this is not consistent with AT. Again, the exclusion of the number of trades in 
Column 2 would not fundamentally change the results. 
Column 2 of Table 6 shows the results for the observations in the two-day rumor 
period. We find a positive relation between AT and AR over the (-1, 0) period at the 1% 
significance level, meaning ARs are much higher on the days with ATs. Size is, as 
expected, negatively related to AR. Rumours with PF funder mentioned are shown to 
be associated positively with ARs by creating abnormal positive trading turnover. In 
addition, it is the only rumour type in our regression significantly positively related to 
ARs on the days with ATs. Target’s option change shows some positive relation to 
ARs, but not to ATs. Rumours have a negative influence on AR, but this not consistent 
with AT. Rumours labeled as analyst, chatter, and initiated by target are all negatively 
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significantly related to ARs through ATs. 
Former studies (Fishe and Robe, 2004; Meubroek, 1992) show that abnormal 
returns, along with abnormal turnover, are associated with insider trading in the 
pre-announcement period. However, we find that during the rumour period or the 
pre-rumour period, which is also included in the pre-announcement period, abnormal 
trading is related to the rumour information. This finding further provides some 
evidence that investors could use the rumour information in the merger transaction. 
 
4.5 Announcement CAR and rumour 
As we have shown that some rumour predictors could anticipate a future 
announcement, we then investigate whether a rumour is a “fraud alert” and whether 
the appearance of initial rumours would affect the stock price responses to a merger 
announcement. After tracking the rumours, we find that only a small portion (75 out 
of 680) turns into a real announcement by searching the SDC database for 
announcements by the same bidder and target after the rumour.  
First, we launch an event study to check the CARs in the run-up and announcement 
period. This study uses the CRSP equal-weighted market model and (-300, -60) 
estimation period. We calculate CAR (-42,-2) as the run-up CAR following Schwert 
(1996), along with CAR (-1, 0) as the announcement CAR. Our sample shows in 
Panel A of Table 7 that bidders have significant negative CARs during the 
announcement period and insignificant negative run-ups. 
Then, we investigate the appearance of rumours or the timing of rumours and 
determine how it impacts the announcements. Hence, we identify the time gap 
between rumour and announcement. As this gap varies from a few days to several 
years, we use LnDays, measured as the natural logarithm of the number of days 
between rumour and announcement. Besides, we control for information released 
from the announcement as features of the contract (all equity and all cash), the 
economic fit between bidder and target (same industry and same state), and the deal 
attitude (friendly), as with Cornett et al. (2011).  
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In Panel B of Table 7, Column 1 reports the results of run-up CARs, while Column 
2 shows the results of two-day CARs at the merger announcements.  
Pound and Zeckhauser (1990) mentioned that if a rumour is information leaked 
from insiders, they are probably the intermediaries who are actually preparing for an 
acquisition attempt. Then, if the rumour is proven correct, the acquiring firm should 
announce a bid relatively shortly thereafter. To the contrary, it might take months or 
years for anticipation rumours to come to fruition. In addition, the correlation matrix 
(Table 8) proves the insider mentioned in the rumours and lower LnDays are 
relatively highly correlated (-0.53). We expect and observe that LnDays is positively 
related to CAR (-1,0) in our regressions, meaning the closer a rumour occurs to an 
announcement, the more negative the impact it would have on the announcement 
CAR. It also implies that trading on an information leak would worsen the bidder’s 
announcement return. 
Characteristic of the deal includes the method of payment used by the bidder. All 
equity is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the deal is financed only with equity 
and 0 otherwise. As well, all cash is another dummy variable that equals 1 when the 
deal is financed only with cash and 0 otherwise. Myers and Majluf (1984) state that 
equity offers tend to overvalue the target. Our results support former research studies, 
showing that stock payment significantly decreases the bidding firm’s shareholder 
value (two-day CAR and run-up) at the 5% statistical level. 
The economic fit considers the industrial and geographical impact on bidder returns. 
The two dummy variables measure whether the two merger partners are in the same 
industry using 3-digit SIC codes, as with Cornett et al. (2011), and whether they are 
located in the same U.S. state. Our results in Table 7 show insignificant support for 
the industry focus or diversification. As for geographic proximity, the former 
literature indicates it affects economic fit in two ways: similar culture (Chakrabarti, 
2009) and bidder’s superior information about the target (Kedia et al.,2005). 
Accordingly, mergers occurring in the same state should be an advantage for bidder’s 
shareholders. However, we observe a significant negative relation with CAR and 
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same state. A possible explanation could be when takeover takes place in different 
states, it would a bigger surprise and less anticipated. And, as Cornett et al. (2011) 
shown, bigger surprise and less anticipated bidders could win higher abnormal 
returns. 
Attitude towards the bid implies the relative bargaining power of the two parties. 
For mergers with a tender offer and friendly attitude, acquiring firm shareholders gain 
more abnormal returns, according to Moeller et al. (2004). However, all our results do 
not significantly support this hypothesis. 
Using a relatively small sample, we find some evidence that the interval between 
rumour date and announcement date is positively related with bidder’s announcement 
CAR. The longer ago a rumour is, the less anticipated the announcement would be. 




This paper investigates how the market would react to the bidder when facing the 
initial information about an acquisition. Despite the difficulty of hand-collected data, 
we examine 680 initial takeover rumours mentioning the possible bidder, publicized 
in newspapers, business journals, and newswires between 2001 and 2013. The size 
effects we find in the rumour abnormal returns seem to capture well the first instance 
of merger anticipation. We further study the source of rumour abnormal returns and 
find that market participants anticipate a future takeover by rumours attributed to an 
insider and those indicating a positive synergy. The abnormal trading turnovers show 
that market participants would trade on this information, thus impounding the rumour 
information into the stock price. Finally, we show some evidence that the anticipation 
power of rumours is related to the length of time between rumour and announcement. 
After all, this paper supports the anticipation hypothesis that investors could predict 
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Sales shock The absolute value of the difference between the two-year 
median industry sales growth and the two-year median sales 






Square of sales shock CRSP- 
COMPUS
TAT 
Size The log of total assets. CRSP- 
COMPUS
TAT 
Change in size The percentage change in the book value of assets of the firm 




Sales growth The change in the firm's net sales in the last two years. CRSP- 
COMPUS
TAT 
Concentration ratio The ratio of sales of the largest four firms (in terms of sales) 






A dummy variable equal to one if i) sales growth for a firm in 
the last two years is less than the industry median and 
long-term debt ratio is greater than the industry median, or ii) 
if sales growth in the last two years is greater than the 
industry median and long-term debt ratio is less than the 




Return on assets 
(ROA) 
The ratio of net income before extraordinary (or nonrecurring) 




Share turnover Ratio of the number of shares of stock traded for the firm to 




Cash ratio Ratio of cash to total assets. CRSP- 
COMPUS
TAT 
Previous mergers Counts the number of times a firm proposes or receives a 




Dormant period The number of months since the last merger in the industry 











Rumor Type   
MultipleBidder A target has more than one potential bidder mentioned. Hand- 
Collected 
PEfund PE or hedge find rumored as buyer OR involved in promoting 
deal (e.g. has many shares and seen as promoting sale of 
company) OR conditions seen as ripe for leveraged buyout. 
Hand- 
Collected 
Analyst Rumor is the result of one or more analysts reasoning that a 
takeover seems logical 
Hand- 
Collected 
Chatter This is a minimalist category designed to reflect 
unsubstantiated discussion with minimal details provided 
Hand- 
Collected 
Insider Anonymous source cited OR specific details provided without 
naming a source and not analyst speculation 
Hand- 
Collected 




Synergy Direct synergy estimates mentioned OR specific attributes of 
the target mentioned as supporting the rumor. 
Hand- 
Collected 










   
Ln Days Natural Logarithm of the number of days between the rumor 
and actual announcement. 
SDC 
All stock Dummy variable equal to one if the payment of the 
transaction is 100% stock and zero otherwise. 
SDC 
All cash Dummy variable equal to one if the payment of the 
transaction is 100% cash and zero otherwise. 
SDC 
Same Industry Dummy variable equal to one if the bidder and target firms 
are in the same industry, using 3-digit SIC code, and zero 
otherwise. 
SDC 
Same State Dummy variable equal to one if the bidder and target firms 
are in the same state and zero otherwise. 
SDC 
Friendly Dummy variable equal to one if the deal attitude is friendly 







Distribution of rumor types over the sample period. This table includes all the 680 rumors with 




2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 All 
Announced 5 6 9 5 8 10 9 7 13 11 83 
MultipleBidder 9 23 19 18 32 39 19 51 57 38 305 
PE Funder 0 2 2 9 14 6 4 6 7 8 58 
Ananlyst 5 27 29 16 28 31 19 67 55 38 315 
Chatter 2 9 6 3 9 11 13 42 22 17 134 
Insider 5 10 10 18 18 13 13 12 24 27 150 
OptionChanges 1 1 0 4 7 9 2 7 7 5 43 
Synergy 0 3 0 2 12 10 16 27 14 12 96 
IntiatedByTarget 6 4 5 1 5 8 9 8 18 5 69 
TargetHasAdvisor 0 4 3 4 1 4 1 5 9 10 41 




Rumor abnormal returns: sorted by bidder size 
Big (small) bidders have the total asset equals to or greater than the median of the whole sample. 
Big (small) -NYSE is a robustness test by separating the sample by total asset within (beyond) top 
10% percentile of NYSE firms in the same year. Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is calculated 
by equally-weighted market model based on the estimation period (-300, -60). A minimum of 100 
days’ estimation is required. The mean difference is tested by T test. ***, **,* represent the 
significance level by T test of 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
 
All Big Small Difference Big(NYSE) Small(NYSE) Difference 
(1) (2) (3) (2)-(3) (4) (5) (4)-(5) 
（-42,-5） -0.42% 0.23% -1.08% 1.31% 0.25% -1.07% 1.32% 
（-42,-2） -0.32% 0.14% -0.78% 0.92% 0.25% -0.87% 1.12% 
（-5,5） 0.22% -0.18% 0.61% -0.79% -0.09% 0.52% -0.61% 
（-2,2） 0.13% -0.21% 0.47%* -0.68%* -0.19% 0.44%* -0.63%* 
(-1,1) 0.10% -0.26%* 0.46%** -0.72%*** -0.22% 0.40%* -0.62%** 
(-1,0) 0.02% -0.30%** 0.37%** -0.67%*** -0.26%* 0.31%* -0.57%** 






Cross-sectional regression analysis of bidder’s rumor abnormal returns 
This table shows the results of regressions on CAR (-42, -2) and CAR (-1, 0), based on 
CRSP-COMPUSTAT database and hand-collected rumor types. ***, **,* represent the 
significance level by T test of 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
  CAR(-42,-2) P>|t| CAR（-1,0） P>|t| 
Sales Shock 0.0326 0.844 0.0368 0.373 
Sale Shock squared -0.1501 0.606 -0.0082 0.910 
Size 0.0035 0.561 -0.0021 0.160 
Change In Size -0.0006 0.965 -0.0002 0.947 
Sales Growth -0.0017 0.781 0.0026 0.104 
Concentration Ratio 0.0881 0.122 0.0202 0.155 
Resource growth mismatch 0.0034 0.8 0.0028 0.406 
ROA 0.0777 0.28 -0.0075 0.674 
Turnover 0.001 0.548 -0.0005 0.203 
Cash Ratio 0.1631** 0.014 0.0334** 0.044 
Price run-up -0.003 0.546 -0.0018 0.139 
Dormant Period -0.0023 0.634 0.0001 0.902 
Previous Merger -0.0065 0.214 0.0009 0.479 
Multiple Bidder -0.0073 0.601 0.0036 0.307 
PE fund -0.0307 0.246 0.0084 0.201 
Analyst -0.0079 0.63 -0.0023 0.576 
Chatter 0.0057 0.753 -0.0021 0.636 
Insider -0.0467** 0.021 -0.0057 0.256 
Option Changes -0.0338* 0.084 0.0057 0.238 
Synergy 0.0456** 0.022 -0.0007 0.888 
Initiated By Target -0.048 0.147 -0.0097 0.241 
Target Financial Advisor 0.045 0.202 0.0030 0.733 














Cross-sectional regression analysis of bidder’s rumor abnormal returns for credible rumours (those 
leading to an announcement) 
This table shows the results of regressions on CAR (-42, -2) and CAR (-1, 0), based on 
CRSP-COMPUSTAT database and hand-collected rumor types. ***, **,* represent the 
significance level by T test of 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
 
CAR(-42,-2) P>|t| CAR(-1,0) P>|t| 
Sales Shock -1.9163** 0.024 -0.2015 0.488 
Sale Shock squared 2.9113** 0.046 0.1635 0.745 
Size 0.0070* 0.668 -0.0057 0.335 
Change In Size -0.0190 0.383 -0.0069 0.382 
Sales Growth -0.0568** 0.031 -0.0237** 0.013 
Concentration Ratio 0.1909 0.291 -0.0590 0.363 
Resource growth mismatch -0.0353 0.393 -0.0264* 0.083 
ROA -0.5069* 0.079 -0.3364*** 0.002 
Turnover -0.0043 0.434 -0.0053** 0.012 
Cash Ratio 0.6829*** 0.008 0.1963** 0.028 
Price run-up 0.0694* 0.088 0.0395*** 0.009 
Dormant Period -0.0147* 0.070 0.0009 0.746 
Previous Merger -0.0236* 0.065 -0.0054 0.229 
Multiple Bidder 0.0352 0.377 0.0134 0.350 
PE fund 0.0906 0.293 0.0414 0.184 
Analyst -0.1313*** 0.005 -0.0239 0.129 
Chatter -0.0799 0.132 -0.0253 0.182 
Insider -0.1280** 0.015 -0.0442** 0.019 
Option Changes -0.0876** 0.047 0.0055 0.720 
Synergy 0.0317 0.453 -0.0192 0.211 
Initiated By Target 0.2158 0.194 -0.0385 0.514 
Target Financial Advisor -0.0688 0.549 0.0401 0.334 












Logit regression of announcement probability 
This table reports the anticipation power of rumors. The dependent variable equals to one if the 
bidder makes a bid for the target after the rumor and zero otherwise. The control variables are 
those collected from CRSP-COMPUSTAT database and rumor types collected by hand. ***, **,* 
represent the significance level by Z test of 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
 Announced P>|z| 
Sales Shock 2.4100 0.58 
Sale Shock squared -1.5720 0.83 
Size 0.0376 0.81 
Change In Size 0.4214 0.22 
Sales Growth 0.4775* 0.09 
Concentration Ratio -2.8298 0.10 
Resource growth mismatch -0.2559 0.48 
ROA -0.6759 0.74 
Turnover -0.0082 0.86 
Cash Ratio 0.5588 0.77 
Price run-up -0.1717 0.41 
Dormant Period 0.3337*** 0.00 
Previous Merger 0.2019 0.12 
Multiple Bidder -0.5792 0.14 
PE fund -0.4199 0.60 
Analyst 0.2832 0.52 
Chatter -0.0940 0.85 
Insider 0.9326* 0.07 
Option Changes 0.3792 0.46 
Synergy 1.0759** 0.02 
Initiated By Target -1.3427 0.23 
Target Financial Advisor -0.1062 0.91 
Constant -2.3737 0.22 
Observations 327 






Price-Volume Dynamic: regression on abnormal returns 
This table reports the price-volume dynamics based on daily observations during the rumor period 
(-42, -2) and (-1, 0). Abnormal returns (ARs) are calculated by equally-weighted market model 
based on the estimation period (-300, -60). A minimum of 100 days’ estimation is required. 
Abnormal turnover (AT) is calculated based on the model in Bris (2005). Ln(ProportionalSpread) 
is the natural logarithm of the proportional bid-ask spread on that day. Ln(NumberOfTrade) is the 
natural logarithm of number of transactions on that day. Size is the natural logarithm of total asset. 
Rumor type is collected by hand, and other variables are collected by CRSP-COMPUSTAT 
database. ***, **,* represent the significance level by T test of 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
 
 
Daily AR（-42，-2) P>|t| Daily AR (-1, 0) P>|t| 
(1)  (2)  
AT -0.0016*** 0.000 0.0059*** 0.004 
Ln(ProportionalSpread) -0.0003 0.287 -0.0007 0.610 
Ln(NumberOfTrade) 0.0009*** 0.002 0.0005 0.709 
Size -0.0008*** 0.004 -0.0018 0.114 
MultipleBidder 0.0001 0.827 0.0000 0.998 
Mul*AT -0.0011*** 0.000 0.0054 0.400 
PE Funder 0.0012 0.302 0.0028 0.607 
PE*AT 0.0010*** 0.001 0.0031** 0.013 
Analyst -0.0006 0.334 -0.0008 0.784 
Analyst*AT 0.0012*** 0.000 -0.0086*** 0.000 
Chatter 0.0000 0.965 -0.0023 0.486 
Chatter*AT 0.0005** 0.030 -0.0070*** 0.001 
Insider -0.0017** 0.022 0.0050 0.117 
Insider*AT 0.0020*** 0.000 -0.0082*** 0.000 
OptionChanges -0.0021** 0.013 0.0045 0.217 
Option*AT 0.0022*** 0.000 -0.0053** 0.017 
Synergy 0.0007 0.329 -0.0036 0.259 
Synergy*AT -0.0008 0.229 -0.0003 0.934 
InitiatedByTarget 0.0002 0.841 -0.0008 0.855 
Initiated*AT -0.0016*** 0.000 -0.0164** 0.014 
TargetHasAdvisor 0.0004 0.704 -0.0034 0.480 
Advisor*AT 0.0013* 0.058 0.0017 0.806 













Announcement abnormal returns and regression on announcement CAR 
This table shows the announcement CAR and the regression for rumoured bidding firms. 
Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is calculated by equally-weighted market model based on the 
estimation period (-300, -60). A minimum of 100 days’ estimation is required. LnDays is the 
natural logarithm of the number of days between rumor and announcement. SameIndustry is a 
dummy variable equals to one when the acquirer and the target have the same 3-digit SIC code. 
SameState is a dummy variable equals to one when both parties have the same geographical state 
in U.S. CashDeal equals to one when the transaction is 100% paid by cash and zero otherwise. 
StockDeal equals to one when the transaction is 100% paid by stock. Friendly is a dummy 
variable when the transaction’s attitude is friendly. The announcement variables are collected from 
SDC database. ***, **,* represent the significance level by T test of 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
 
  
Panel A (-42, -2) (-1,0) 
Announcement  -1.96% -0.55%* 
Observation 75 75 
Panel B (-42,-2) P>|t| (-1,0) P>|t| 
 (1)  (2)  
LnDays 0.0010 0.890 0.0051** 0.037  
SameIndusty -0.0080 0.798 0.0033 0.747  
SameState -0.0182 0.574 -0.0242** 0.026  
CashDeal -0.0072 0.836 -0.0026 0.820  
StockDeal -0.1296** 0.014 -0.0362** 0.035  
Friendly 0.0063 0.861 0.0100 0.398  
Constant -0.0120 0.804 -0.0252 0.114  
Observations 68  68  




Correlation matrix between announcement variables and insider dummy 
This matrix report the correlation between the announcement variables collected from SDC 






LnDays SameI SameS Cash Stock Friendly Insider 
LnDays 1 
      SameIndustry 0.15 1 
     SameState 0.20 0.10 1 
    CashDeal -0.15 -0.03 -0.04 1 
   StockDeal -0.06 0.01 0.09 -0.25 1 
  Friendly -0.07 0.02 0.25 0.39 0.23 1 
 Insider -0.53 -0.16 -0.20 0.01 0.22 0.21 1 
